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ABSTRACT
Android devices have gained a lot of attention in the last few decades due to several reasons including 
ease of use, effectiveness, availability and games, among others. To take advantage of Android devices, 
mobile users have begun installing an increasingly substantial number of Android applications on their 
devices. Rapid growth in many Android devices and applications has led to security and privacy issues. 
It has, for instance, opened the way for malicious applications to be installed on the Android devices 
while downloading different applications for different purposes. This has caused malicious applications 
to execute illegal operations on the devices that result in malfunction outputs. Android botnets are one 
of these malfunctions. This paper presents Android botnets in various aspects including their security, 
architecture, infection vectors and techniques. This paper also evaluates Android botnets by categorising 
them according to behaviour. Furthermore, it investigates the Android botnets with respect to Android 
device threats. Finally, we investigate different Android botnet detection techniques in depth with respect 
to the existing solutions deployed to mitigate Android botnets.   
Keywords: Android botnets, malware, detection 
techniques, DDoS attacks, mobile security
INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices (mobile devices/android 
devices are used interchangeably in this 
article) are gaining popularity in the 21st 
century (Narudin, Feizollah, Anuar, & Gani, 
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2016). These devices offer a host of advanced capabilities and ample storage of large volumes 
of personal and confidential data (Peng, Yu, & Yang, 2014). Nowadays, most mobile devices 
offer more computing capabilities and memory storage than many personal computers did a 
few years back. According to former Android boss Andy Rubin, “There should be nothing that 
users can access on their desktop that they cannot access on their cellphone” (Rubin, 2008). Any 
mobile device has three core features, such as Applications, Storage and Connectivity. These 
key features make Android devices an attractive tool for malware writers to attack organsation/
individual devices. While protecting stored data on these devices is crucial against today’s 
threats, most mobile devices use the Android operating system due to its open nature. Android 
provides a full set of software for Android devices including operating system, middleware 
and key Android applications (Sears, 2007). The open nature of Android devices make  these 
devices an attractive source for cybercriminals and over the years there has been a number 
of threats faced by mobile devices such as spyware, botnet, vulnerable applications, privacy 
threats, drive-by-download, phishing scams, malware, network exploits, browser exploits and 
Wi-Fi sniffing (Fossi et al., 2011; Inayat, Gani, Anuar, Khan, & Anwar, 2016), Botnet is one 
of the most dangerous threats faced by mobile devices recently. 
Malware is used to damage Internet-connected devices and gather sensitive information 
from individuals or it uses spyware for accessing the most private information on the infected 
device (Sharma, Chawla, & Gajrani, 2016). Spyware gathers all this information specifically 
for advertising purposes (Sheta, Zaki, El Salam, & Hadad, 2015). Privacy threats can be 
caused by those Android applications that may not be malicious by nature but use sensitive 
information obtained illegally from unsuspecting Android users. Vulnerable applications 
are those that contain deficiencies that may cause malicious attacks and malicious activities. 
Phishing scams are those that use the victim’s device emails for sending the virus infected links 
to the Internet-connected devices (Naraine, 2012). In drive-by-download, the infected devices 
download an application when they access a website. While the browser-exploits benefits from 
the vulnerabilities in mobile device web browsers or applications launched by the browser 
such as flash player, PDF reader and much more,  in network exploits, cybercriminals take 
advantage of Android operating system flaws for criminal activities (Naser, Zolkipli, Majid, & 
Anwar, 2014). When the data are transferred from one device to another connected by Wi-Fi 
as many applications do not use proper security rules, this results in data obstruction known 
as Wi-Fi sniffing. In this article, we focus on the Android botnet.
A botnet (Robot Network) is a type of malware that enables the infected devices to 
perform criminal activities according to the botmaster’s instructions (Anwar, Zain, Inayat, Haq, 
Karim, & Jaber, 2016; Naser et al., 2014; Peng et al., 2014). A malicious Android application 
is installed in a susceptible host that is capable of carrying out a series of different harmful 
activities to the end user according to the botmaster’s instructions. These applications can be 
downloaded to the victims’ devices using different methods. The most common ways to infect 
a victim’s device includes access to the infected websites, drive-by-download, spam emails, 
viral mechanism and much more (Anwar, Zain, Zolkipli, Inayat, Khan, Anthony, & Chang, 
2017; Karim, Shah, Salleh, Arif, Md Noor, & Shamshirband, 2015). Once an end-user’s device 
is infected with malicious software, it receives instructions from the cybercriminal (botmaster) 
through a command and control server using communication channels. Botmaster is the entity 
Android Botnets: A Serious Threat to Android Devices
39Pertanika J. Sci. & Technol. 26 (1): 37 - 70 (2018)
that performs criminal activities from these bot devices, while a communication channel is 
the way through which a botmaster can communicate with the C&C server and bots. A bot 
can be a servant and a client as well at the same time. It can propagate themselves to infect 
vulnerable hosts (Silva, Silva, Pinto, & Salles, 2013).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper aims to present the Android botnet from first 
appearance. We aim to guide interested readers and researchers on Android botnets and 
detection techniques. This paper organises the Android botnet detection techniques with respect 
to their benefits and limitations; understanding this information can improve Android botnet 
detection techniques. 
The key contributions of this survey paper are:  
- It provides up-to-date information on mobile device threats: We provide comprehensive 
details of the possible threats to mobile devices. We have also categorised these threats in 
sub-groups according to their nature. 
- It provides exhaustive information about Android botnets: We provide in-depth information 
about Android botnets, their background and timeline.
- We provide in-depth information about Android botnet detection techniques:  This paper 
presents detailed information about Android botnet detection techniques. We explain these 
techniques regarding their benefits and limitations. These limitations are also explained 
in more detail in table form.
- We introduce future research challenges: We suggest potential research areas for Android 
botnet detection techniques and we highlight the challenges present in Android botnet 
detection techniques as well.
Classification of Mobile Device Threats
There are diverse types of threat to mobile devices that may badly affect mobile devices, such 
as viruses and spyware that can infect personal computers (PC). These threats can be divided 
into four broad categories: Application-Level, Web-Level, Network-Level and Physical-Level 
(see Figure 1).
Application-Level Threats
Application-level threats are based on the Applications, which are the core feature of every 
mobile device. These threats appear to be the most widely discussed threats in the literature, 
which presents application-level threats as the most widely discussed threat. Since the 
applications that run on these mobile devices are available from third-party markets, it is 
clear that they can be target vectors for mobile device security breaches (Faruki et al., 2015). 
Malware are Android applications that perform malicious activities can inject malicious 
codes into mobile device that send unsolicited messages and allow an adversary the ability to 
remotely control the device.  
Malware. Malware is short for ‘malicious software’. This is specifically developed to damage 
machines on which they are executed or the network on which it communicates (Inayat, Gani, 
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Anuar, Anwar, & Khurram Khan, 2017; Preda, Christodorescu, Jha, & Debray, 2008). Malware 
is mostly installed on victims’ devices to perform illegal activities without the knowledge of the 
owner. The range of malware varies; it can be as simple as pop-up advertising or so dangerous 
that it causes machine invasion or damage. Stealing owner-sensitive credentials and infecting 
new vulnerable devices are the main targets of malware. The most common malware is found 
as financial, crypto locker and advertisement malware (Anwar, Zain, Zolkipli, Inayat, Jabir, 
& Odili, 2015). 
Financial malware is developed for scanning mobile devices to gather financial information, 
while crypto locker malware is used in cyber-criminal activities. According to the Symantec 
report published in 2013, ransomware evolves regularly in the Android operating system. 
Compared with other OS on mobile devices, Android is most frequently attacked because of its 
open nature (Narudin et al., 2016; Odili, Kahar, & Anwar, 2015; Teufl et al., 2013). Ransomware 
allows cybercriminals to hijack the victim’s device, encrypt the victim’s private files and then 
demand a ransom from the victim in order for the files to be released (Anwar et al., 2017). 
Malicious spyware is considered a significant threat to the confidentiality of mobile devices 
(Sheta, Zaki, El Salam, & Hadad, 2015). It covertly collects confidential data from the infected 
device and sends it to the cybercriminal (Botmaster) through the user’s Internet connection 
without the owner’s knowledge. These applications mostly contain freeware or shareware, 
which can be downloaded from third-party markets. Adware is another type of malware. It is 
a software package that automatically displays related advertisements to the mobile device 
users based on the user’s pattern of web surfing. These advertisements may be present during 
the installing phase of any Android application, or they are present when an end-user is using 
these applications. This adware engages in collecting confidential information, frequently by 
user consent, while stealing this personal information for covert harmful activities.
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Figure 1. Threats to mobile device security. 
 
Web-Level Threats 
The security and privacy threats to mobile devices from webs happens normally. The most 
dangerous web-level threats are phishing scams, drive-by-download and browser exploits. 
Phishing scams are the key web-level threat, which uses email or other social media apps to 
send an unwitting user links to a phishing website designed to trick users into providing 
sensitive information such as user credentials. Phishing is one of the top seven security 
threats identified by the Kaspersky lab (Kaspersky, 2015). However, botware is the most 
dangerous threat to mobile devices nowadays. These are software programmes created to 
automatically perform specific operations. 
Phishing scams.  Phishing refers to the criminal action of generating a replica of web pages 
that exist to fool a mobile user entering private, extremely sensitive credentials, financial or 
online banking information and passwords (Alta, Loock, & Dabrowski, 2005). Phishing is a 
technique of attacking to obtain personal information from a mobile device user and is the 
main cause of various problems encountered by Internet users. This technique can cost the 
victim financially. Phishing is performed through instant messenger phishing, voice phishing, 
and flash phishing (Dunne, 2006; Milletary & Center, 2005). After launching a phishing 
attack on an individual or an organisation, the employees of the organisation handle the 
customer when he calls after losing his money. 
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to send an unwitting user links to a phishing website designed to trick users into providing 
sensitive information such as user credentials. Phishing is one of the top seven security threats 
identified by the Kaspersky lab (Kaspersky, 2015). However, botware is the most dangerous 
threat to mobile devices nowadays. These are software programmes created to automatically 
perform specific operations.
Phishing scams. Phishing refers to the criminal action of generating a replica of web pages 
that exist to fool a mobile user entering private, extremely sensitive credentials, financial or 
online banking information and passwords (Alta, Loock, & Dabrowski, 2005). Phishing is a 
technique of attacking to obtain personal information from a mobile device user and is the main 
cause of various problems encountered by Internet users. This technique can cost the victim 
financially. Phishing is performed through instant messenger phishing, voice phishing, and 
flash phishing (Dunne, 2006; Milletary & Center, 2005). After launching a phishing attack on 
an individual or an organisation, the employees of the organisation handle the customer when 
he calls after losing his money.
Drive-by-Download. A drive-by-download refers to potentially harmful software code that 
is installed on a person’s computer without the user’s permission; the user may not even be 
aware that the software has been installed. Drive-by-downloads are a form of malware typically 
found on compromised web pages. By simply ‘driving by’, or visiting the web page, the drive-
by-download begins to download and is then installed in the background on the computer or 
mobile device without alerting the user (Naraine, 2012). 
Browser exploits. This is a malicious code that uses a piece of software or operating 
vulnerabilities to breach the security of the browser. Browser exploits perform these malicious 
activities without informing the owner of the device. 
Botnets. Short for robot network, botnet, is the network of Internet-connected infected-devices 
(bots) under the control of a botmaster (cybercriminal) to perform cyber-criminal activities 
without the knowledge of the device owner (Anwar, Mohamad Zain, Zolkipli, & Inayat, 2014). 
There are two types of botnet:  traditional botnets and mobile botnets. This paper focusses on 
mobile (Android) botnets. The purpose of Android botnets will most likely be similar to those 
of existing traditional botnets (e.g. providing means of DoS, DDoS and spam distribution); 
however, the targets are different (Enck, Ongtang, & McDaniel, 2009). In mobile botnets, the 
targets are mobile devices.
A common botnet having thousands of infected victims is called a bot (zombie). The 
botmaster sends instructions to all online bots to send queries to a particular system/server 
(Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004). By attacking a new victim from thousands of different bots in a 
botnet, the DoS (DDoS) is distributed. In a DDoS attack, the bot becomes harder to detect 
and it is difficult for cyber law enforcement to prevent DDoS attacks. Some DDoS attacks 
include UDP flood attacks, Zero-day DDoS attacks, Sync flood attacks, ICMP flood attacks, 
Slowloris and Ping of Death (LulzSec, 2011; Zang, Tangpong, Kesidis, & Miller, 2011). DDoS 
attacks are performed using diverse types of tool, such as agent- and IRC-based tools. These 
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attacks can be detected through screening of the time interval of requests and bandwidth size. 
Some DDoS attacks, such as Zero-day attacks, are unknown or new and thus, have no patch 
yet. The term DDoS is well-known among hackers as dealing with Zero-day vulnerabilities 
is a common activity.
Network-Level Threats
Any mobile device has three core features: applications, storage and connectivity. Network-
level threats can occur due to mobile device connectivity with the cellular/mobile networks, 
local wireless networks or near field-communication (NFC). Network exploits, Wi-Fi sniffing, 
Bluetooth and NFC are the main types of network-level threats.
Network exploits. Network exploits take advantage of flaws in the mobile operating system 
or other software that operates on local or cellular networks, such as an International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catcher. Once connected, they can intercept data connections and 
find a way to inject malicious software on users’ phones without their knowledge.
Wi-Fi sniffing. Wi-Fi sniffing seizes data when they are traveling between the device and 
the Wi-Fi access point. Most Android applications do not use proper security measures while 
sending unencrypted data across the network. A cybercriminal can easily read the data as they 
travel. Public sites such as coffee shops, restaurants and bookstores may have WPA2, but it is 
likely that anyone with the password can decrypt your packets.
Bluetooth. People who leave BT on all the time leave themselves vulnerable to pairing from 
nefarious devices and the uploading of spyware. Blue jacking is an older-style attack in which 
a Bluetooth enabled device that is active is used by someone else. Blue jacking refers to the 
sending of unsolicited data (vCards etc.) to open Bluetooth listeners in the area. It has more 
recently been used for marketing, but many more modern smartphones are less vulnerable 
to Bluetooth stack exploits. This can lead to phishing attempts and the spread of malware or 
viruses.
Near field communication (NFC).  Advanced mobile devices contain near field communication 
(NFC) as a medium for communication. NFC is a newly developed wireless technology that 
provides communication between two mobile devices, both of which must contain NFC tags 
using short-range radio waves. NFC enables the exchange of images, apps and other data 
between two devices without first pairing them. For this purpose, both devices use a feature 
that Google calls Android Beam (Sauter, 2013), while Beam is Android’s trademark for NFC 
when the protocol is used for device-to-device communication. In the NFC communication, 
only two devices can communicate, such as the initiator and target. The initiator sends data, 
while the target receives them; both devices are active during the communication, consuming 
their own battery power. NFC provides extra opportunities to the attacker to compromise NFC-
enabled devices, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. So far, mobile threats are still mainly aimed at 
consumers rather than at enterprises. 
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Physical-Level Threats
Physical-level threats are more important than other mentioned threats. Since mobile devices 
are small, portable and valuable, it makes their physical security more important. Stealing and 
misplacing devices are the common issue among users of these devices. These devices are 
valuable not only because they are resold in the black market, but more importantly, because 
they contain sensitive organisational and personal data. Most mobile device users use their 
phone for banking, social communication and much more, while end-user are always connected 
to these accounts, which makes the stolen or misplaced phone more vulnerable for criminal 
activities. Furthermore, a lost or stolen device can be used to gain access to secret data stored 
on it. 
Android Botnets as a Universal Threat for Mobile Device Users
The dramatic increment in the number of mobile device users has attracted cybercriminals to 
develop malicious applications (Narudin et al., 2016). In addition, mobile devices contain more 
sensitive information about the owners; this tends to be taken lightly by security organisations 
and individuals. A mobile device can be misused in many ways. The botnet is one of the most 
successful methods by which a mobile device can be misused for malicious activities against 
organisations or individuals.
Android Botnet as a Threat for Organisations
Android botnets are mostly used for organised economic fraud. Today, world economies must 
deal with a broad range of botnets that have caused a considerable amount of damage. About 
USD7.1 million was estimated lost due to click fraud performed by botnets using DDoS attacks 
in 2007 (Plohmann, Gerhards-Padilla, & Leder, 2011). It is very hard to detect click fraud, as 
these target legitimate users while they are surfing websites. According to a published report, 
on every USD3 million spent on digital advertisement, USD1million is spent on click fraud. 
Another statistics report showed that digital advertising hit the highest level of fraud in 2015, 
which was estimated at USD27.5 billion (Slefo, 2015). According to Kaspersky’s monitoring 
results, 35,000 malicious mobile programmess were found at the end of 201. These malicious 
programmes steal sensitive data from the end-user devices, consume account balances while 
running digital advertisements, which is pushed by these malicious programmes (Christian 
& Maria, 2013). Kaspersky released security threat statistics for the year 2015, in which they 
blocked 0.8 billion attacks and used a list of 6.5 million unique host, to from web resources 
located in various countries around the world (LAB, 2015).
Android Botnet as a Threat for Individuals
Mobile devices offer advanced capabilities, with more storage capacity that can store 
organisational and confidential data of end users (Peng et al., 2014). Furthermore, advanced 
mobile devices offer more computing capabilities than many of personal computers offered a 
few years back. A mobile device has three main features, such as Android applications, storage, 
and connectivity with internet or cellular network (Rubin, 2008). Once a mobile device becomes 
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part of the Android botnet, botmasters attempt to take complete control of it to enable the 
botnet creator to perform illegal activities without the knowledge of the end user. After taking 
control of the mobile device, a botmaster can access everything from the compromised device. 
Furthermore, sending texts and making phone calls to premium numbers can be performed with 
these compromised devices. Botmaster can access contacts and messages on the compromised 
devices as well. These botnets take advantage of unpatched Android application updates. 
Android Botnet Security
As smartphones are the largest category of Android devices, they have become an essential 
tool in how people communicate with one another. Each Android device has three key features: 
Applications, online and storage. Android applications are one of the core features of Android 
devices. They enable users to play games, read the news, connect with others, check weather 
conditions, perform online banking, read maps and navigators and perform many other 
functions. These applications are available from third parties like Google Play Store and 
Amazon (Silva et al., 2013). It may be a primary feature for many end users. 
The core function of the Android device is to enable the user to make calls, take 
photographs, send text or picture messages and access personal data storage. It also allows 
the developer to develop richer applications. The developer may also access the user’s address 
book, SMS content, GPS location data, movement data by G-sensor and accelerometer and 
even information in other applications. The Android does not differentiate between the phone’s 
core applications and third-party applications. However, such applications from third parties 
can access personal/confidential information in the Android device very easily. These core 
features of Android devices make these devices an easy target for cybercriminals. 
In this modern era, trojanised Android applications are a common infection method of 
Android devices. This is most often targeted by cybercriminals who use different types of 
malware. Botnet, a dangerous malware, compromises Android devices such as smartphones, 
smartware, tablets and notebooks, attempting to get full access to the device and provide 
control to the botmaster. The data found on Android devices include text messages (SMS/
MMS), contacts, call logs, e-mail messages (Gmail, Yahoo), chats, location coordinates using 
the global positioning system (GPS), photographs, videos, web history, search history, driving 
directions, Facebook and Twitter information, music collections and other information. These 
third-party applications provide a simple and easy means of accessing content and services of 
Android devices. It is important to be aware of how to use these third-party applications safely 
and securely. Android botnets are able to spread themselves by sending copies to compromised 
devices. 
The criminal activity the Trojan-Ransom.Android-OS.Small family is a multifunctional 
ransomware Trojan performed by an Android botnet. After connecting to the botnet army, it 
receives commands from the command and control channel and performs the activities received 
from them. Once run, it asks for the victim’s device’s admin rights and loads information 
about the victim’s device to a malicious server. It can be an international mobile equipment 
identity (IMEI), international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), device model, brand and 
phone number or other information. 
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In addition, the Trojan is registered in the Google cloud messaging (GCM) system. As 
such, the Trojan can receive commands from both the C&C server and via GCM. With this 
information, it can perform the commands shown in Table 1.
Table 1 
Commands between C&C server and trojan  
Command Description
START Start the main service of the Trojan
STOP Stop the main service of the Trojan
RESTART Restart the main service of the Trojan
URL Change the C&C address
MESSAGE Send an SMS to a specified number with a specified text
UPDATE_PATTERNS Update the rules for processing incoming SMS
UNBLOCK Disable the device administrator’s rights
UPDATE Download a file from the specified URL and instal it
CONTACTS Send out a specified SMS to all contacts from the list of contacts
LOCKER_UPDATE Update the text with the ransom demand
LOCKER_BLOCK Block the device
LOCKER_UNBLOCK Unblock the device
CHANGE_GCM_ID Change the GCM id
The main idea behind botnets is to control interaction in Internet Relay Chat (IRC) chat rooms. 
They are able to interpret simple commands, provide administration support, offer simple games 
and other services to chat users and retrieve information about operating systems, logins, email 
addresses and aliases, in addition to other information (Silva et al., 2013). The first known 
iKee.B Mobile botnet was found in 2009. It was discovered to be using the Command and 
Control Server in the iPhone. This botnet is able to propagate itself and to instal third-party 
applications on the end-user’s phone without user information (Peng et al., 2014). 
Table 2 shows the timeline of Android botnets with respect to their first appearance in terms 
of year, platform, instruction, categories and C&C type in addition to other related information.
Table 2 
Android Botnet timeline 
Year Name C&C Type Botnet Instructions Criminal Activities by 
Default
Requires Permission
2010 SMSHowU.A SMS Leak location, GPS and 
maps through SMS
None N/A
2011 Geinimi.A HTTP ON, OFF, ADD or Set or 
Rem Sender
IMEI, IMSI, SIM, SIM 
state, Build info, GPS, 
Board, Brand, CPU type, 
User, Software version, SIM 
country, SIM operator
N/A
DroidKungFu.A HTTP Leak location, GPS and 
maps through SMS
Send sensitive data, 
execDelete, Exploit known 
vulnerabilities to gain root, 
Instal APK, execOpenUrl, 
execStartApp
N/A
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2012 Fjcon.A HTT Phone ICCID; Financial, Propagation of 
malware
N/A
Rootsmart HTTP action.host start; action.
boot; action.shutdown; 
action.install; action.
installed; action.check 
live;action.download apk;
IMEI, IMSI, cell ID, 
location area code, mobile 
network code
N/A
TigerBot.A SMS Change APN; Notify of 
SIM change; Kill running 
process
IMEI N/A
2013 Stealer.B HTTP and 
SMS 
HTTP: time; sms; send; 
delete; smscf SMS: 
ServerKey +001; +002; 
anything
IMEI, IMSI, contacts READ_SMS;
INTERNET;
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED; READ_
PHONE_STATE;
RECEIVE_SMS;
READ_CONTACTS;
SEND_SMS;
WRITE_EXTERNAL_
STORAGE
Tascudap.A HTTP time; sms; send; 
delete;smscfSMS: 
ServerKey + 001; 002; 
anything
Specify time when trojan 
should next contact C&C, 
send SMS, delete SMS 
from phone, selective SMS 
hiding, start application, 
forward received SMS, 
update
READ_SMS;
ACCESS_NETWORK
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
RECEIVE_SMS;
READ_CONTACTS;
SEND_SMS;
WRITE_EXTERNAL_
STORAGA;
BadNews.A HTTP news; showpage; install; 
showinstall; iconpage; 
coninstall; newdomen; 
seconddomen; stop; 
testpost
Propagation of possible 
malware; download and 
instal APK
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED; SEND_
SMS;
RECEIVE_SMS;
INTERNET;
ACCEESS_INTERNAL_
MEMORY;
ACCESS_EXTENAL_
MEMORY;
Spamsold.A SMS Display same icon on the 
menu, retain the image 
same but the name may 
change, instal APK once 
clicked
Sends SMS spam messages 
without the user’s consent
INTERNET;
CHANGE_
COMPONENT_
ENABLED;
RECEIVE_SMS;
READ_SMS;
SEND_SMS
WRITE_SMS;
RECEIVE_SMS;
RAISED_THREAD_
PRIORITY; READ_
CONTACTS;
WRITE_EXTERNAL;
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED; WAKE_
LOCK;
Table 2 (continue)
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2014 FrictSpy.E3 HTTP; SMS Command and Control to 
execute malware activities 
such as call records, 
use camera for pictures 
and videos, use mic for 
recording voice
Incoming/Outgoing call; 
Incoming/Outgoing SMS, 
GPS location information, 
URLs that the device user 
accesses
ACCESS_NETWORK_
STATE; CALL_PHONE;
GET_TASKS;
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_SMS;
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED;
RECEIVE_SMS;
SEND_SMS;
SYSTEM_ALERT_
WINDOW;
WAKE_LOCK;
WRITE_SMS;
Geinimi.A HTTP ON, OFF, ADD or Set or 
Rem Sender
User, Software version, 
IMEI, SIM State, CPU type, 
SIM country, IMSI, SIM, 
SIM operator, build info, 
GPS, Board, Brand
CALL_PHONE;
GET_TASKS;
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_SMS;
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED;
RECEIVE_SMS;
SEND_SMS;
SYSTEM_ALERT_
WINDOW;
WAKE_LOCK;
WRITE_SMS;
SpyBubb.A SMS Leak location, GPS and 
maps through SMS; HTTP: 
time; sms; send; delete; 
smscf SMS: ServerKey 
+001; +002; anything
Collect SMS, Call, Fine 
location, Coarse location, 
GPS, Device info like IMEI, 
IMSI etc. Share phone 
information to vendor site
ACCESS_NETWORK_
STATE;
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
INTERNET;
WAKE_LOCK;
2015 Leech.A HTTP action.host start; action.
boot; action.shutdown; 
action.install; action.
installed; action.check 
live;action.download apk
Instal itself persistently, 
run with full privileges, 
unwanted payment through 
SMS, spying activities, 
dynamically load command 
and control server
ACCESS_NETWORK_
STATE;
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
INTERNET;
WAKE_LOCK;
Tediss SMS N/A Monitor calls, SMS and 
conversation applications
CALL_PHONE;
GET_TASKS;
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_SMS;
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED; 
RECEIVE_SMS;
SEND_SMS;
SYSTEM_ALERT_
WINDOW;
WAKE_LOCK;
WRITE_SMS;
WormHole.A HTTP and 
SMS
WormHole.A 
HTTP and SMS
Instal applications without 
notification; Location 
information; Add contact 
items; Monitor list of 
applications
READ_EXTERNAL_
STORAGE;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_NETWORK_
STATE;
INTERNET;
READ_INTERNAL_
STORAGE;
WAKE_LOCK;
READ_COARS_
LOCATION;
Table 2 (continue)
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Table 2 (continue)
SilverPush.A HTTP and 
SMS
HTTP: time; sms; send; 
delete; smscf SMS: 
ServerKey +001; +002; 
anything; ON, OFF, ADD 
or Set or Rem Sender
IMEI number; Operating 
system version; Location; 
Potentially the identity of the 
owner; Behaviour of users 
using TVs; Web browsers; 
Radios
ACCESS_NETWORK_
STATE; CALL_PHONE;
GET_TASKS
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_SMS;
RECEIVE_SMS;
SEND_SMS;
WRITE_SMS;
2016 MazarBOT.A SMS N/A Sends premium SMS, 
exfiltrate sensitive 
information and steal the 
received SMS messages by 
setting up a backdoor on 
device
ACCESS_NETWORK_
STATE;
CALL_PHONE;
GET_TASKS;
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_SMS;
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED;
RECEIVE_SMS;
SEND_SMS;
SYSTEM_ALERT_
WINDOW;
WAKE_LOCK;
WRITE_SMS;
Morder.A HTTP and 
SMS
Command and Control to 
execute Malware activities 
such as calls record, 
use camera for pictures 
and videos, use mic for 
recording voice
Track location; Leak 
contacts to C&C
Upload data from SD Card 
to C&C; Delete or download 
files in the infected device; 
Leak phone call history; 
Take pictures with the 
camera; Record audio 
and calls; Execute shell 
commands
ACCESS_NETWORK_
STATE;
CALL_PHONE;
GET_TASKS;
ACCESS_FINE_
LOCATION;
ACCESS_COARS_
LOCATION;
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_SMS;
RECEIVE_BOOT_
COMPLETED;
RECEIVE_SMS;
SEND_SMS;
SYSTEM_ALERT_
WINDOW;
WAKE_LOCK;
WRITE_SMS;
Smishing.D SMS time; sms; send; delete; 
smscf SMS: ServerKey 
+001; +002; anything; ON, 
OFF, ADD or Set or Rem 
Sender
Detect text messages; 
Access fraudulent fake bank 
URL; Steal user’s sensitive 
credential; Password 
stealing; Additional 
information stealing
ACCESS_NETWORK_
STATE;
CALL_PHONE;
GET_TASKS;
INTERNET;
READ_PHONE_STATE;
READ_SMS;
RECEIVE_SMS;
SEND_SMS;
WRITE_SMS;
NA=Not Available, HTTP=Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol, SMS=Short Message Service, PUP=Potential 
Unwanted Programmes, SD=Secure Digital, C&C=Command & Control Servers, IMEI=International 
Mobile Equipment Identity, IMSI=International Mobile Subscriber Identity, HTTP=Hyper-Text 
Transfer Protocol 
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Components of Android Botnet
A typical Android botnet has four elementary components as shown in Figure 2: bot, botmaster, 
command and control server and communication channel.
22 
 
Figure 2. Typical android botnet structure. 
Components of Android Botnet 
A typical Android botnet has four elementary components as shown in Figure 2: bot, 
botmaster, co mand and control server and communication channel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bot.  A bot is a malicious Android application that is installed in a susceptible host that can 
perform a series of different harmful actions upon the end user at a cybercriminal’s 
command. This application can be installed to the victim devices in diverse ways. The 
most common ways include access to the infected websites, drive-by-downloads, spam 
emails, viral mechanisms and much more (Karim et al., 2015). Once an end-user device is 
infected with malicious software, it receives commands and controls from the botmaster 
through the command and control server using communication channels. A bot can be a 
servant and client at the same time. 
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Bot. A bot is a malicious Android application that is installed in a susceptible host that can 
perform a series of different harmful actions upon the end user at a cybercriminal’s command. 
This application can be installed to the victim devices in diverse ways. The most common ways 
include access to the infected websites, drive-by-downloads, spam emails, viral mechanisms and 
much more (Karim et al., 2015). Once an end-user device is infected with malicious software, 
it receives commands and controls from the botmaster through the command and control server 
using communication channels. A bot an be a servant and client at the same time.
Botmaster. The attacker is also known as the botmaster, who maintains and operates the 
command and control of botnets from remot  areas. The botmaster, also known as the bot-
herder, is responsible for a variety of malicious activities. Botmasters ensure that errors are 
fixed and that the bot does not break any of the rules of the channel or server it is logged into. 
Most botmasters hide their identity via proxies, the onion ring (TOR) and/or shells to disguise 
their ip address from detection by investigators and law enforcement agents.
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Command control server. The term ‘command and control’ (C&C) is a military concept. 
Command and Control servers allow a bot entity to take new instructions and malicious 
capabilities as commanded by a remote individual (botmaster). These servers are used to control 
botnets, in particular. Command and control in the botnet’s Fast-flux Domain Name System 
(DNS) can be used to make track the control server difficult to do, as the server may change 
from day to day. These servers may also hop from one DNS domain to another. The Domain 
Generation Algorithm (DGA) is used presently to create new DNS names for controller servers. 
A botnet may have different C&C server topologies like Star, Multi-Server, Hierarchical and 
Random topology.
Communication channels. The botnet communication channel refers to the protocol used by 
bots and the botmaster to communicate with each other. Bluetooth, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), peer-to-peer (P2P) and voice over internet protocol 
(VoIP) servers are used to pass information between bots and the botmaster. The botmaster 
creates IRC channels on the C&C server, after which the compromised machines will wait for 
commands to perform malicious activities. An interesting feature of the IRC protocol is the 
possibility of multicast communication through groups. The IRC channel has some serious 
limitations like being easy to detect and interrupt. It is rarely used in corporate networks and 
is usually blocked (Silva et al., 2013). 
Due to these limitations of the IRC channel, the HTTP has become the most usable 
mechanism for implementing command and control communication (Liu, Chen, Yan, & Zhang, 
2008). The first Android botnet named SymbOS/Yxes, which appeared in 2009, (Suarez 
Tangil, Tapiador, Peris-Lopez, & Ribagorda, 2014) targeted the SYMBIAN OS platform 
using a rudimentary HTTP-based command and control (C&C) channel. Centralised botnets 
are not more secure as discussed above, so the trend shifted to decentralised botnets. Most of 
the decentralised botnets are based on a variety of P2P protocols (Jelasity & Bilicki, 2009). 
Similarly, VoIP is used as the communication channel in vishing (VoIP and phishing) instead 
of the more usual email technique. 
Life Cycle of Android Botnet
Android botnets can come in different structures and sizes, but in general, they go through the 
same steps as computer botnets (Silva et al., 2013), as shown in Figure 3. An active botnet 
requires the bot device to complete its life cycle. A typical Android botnet can be developed 
and maintained in five phases: initial infection, secondary injection, connection, malicious 
command and control, update and maintenance. In the first phase, initial infection, the end-user 
device is infected and becomes an active member of the Android botnet. The second phase, 
secondary injecting, can be carried out by injecting the malicious code into the end-user devices 
through Bluetooth, drive-by-download, automatic scan, NFC and Wi-Fi (Faruki et al., 2015). 
After injecting the code into the victim’s device, the bot finds a way to connect to the 
command and control server. This happens in the connection phase, which is the only phase 
that may occur several times during the botnet’s life cycle (Liu et al., 2008). Once an infected 
device connects to the Android botnet’s command and control server, the botmaster will send 
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commands through the C&C server using communication channels, while the bots await 
commands from the botmaster. 
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The last phase of the Android botnet’s life cycle is updating and maintenance of the infected 
devices. Maintenance is important for a botnet to keep his army of infected devices active. The 
new updates are then sent to these bots many times for many reasons that propagate the different 
types of criminal activity such as spamming, identity theft, DDoS attacks and much ore.
Mobile Device Infection Vectors
There are multiple infection vectors for delivering malicious content to mobile devices. In 
this survey, we classify infection vectors into four categories: SMS/MMS, Bluetooth, Internet 
access and file duplication with USB. Cellular services, such as short message service (SMS) 
and multimedia messaging service (MMS), can be used as attack vectors for smartphones, 
as sh wn in Figure 4. For example, SMS/MMS messages can be used to deliver malicious 
content and to maintain communication with an attacker. For example, ComWar is a worm that 
browses the host’s phonebook and then spreads via SMS/MMS messages (Peng et al., 2014).
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Bluetooth
Bluetooth is short-range radio communication protocol used for exchanging data over a limited 
distance between Bluetooth-enabled devices. Device-to-Device (D2D) malware attacks are 
performed on the bases of Bluetooth. Once the cybercriminal infects a smartphone with the bot 
code, it can enable Bluetooth without the knowledge of the owner and target another Bluetooth-
enabled device in its range. If the connection is established, the infected device sends the bot 
code to the targeted device using this Bluetooth vector. This limits the attack vector in some 
way, such as one-to-one connection, limited distance range and others.
Drive-by-Download
To secure Android devices from botnet attacks, users should only visit reputable websites 
for downloading application software and other video/audio materials. Botnet infection is 
possibly acquired by visiting a malicious website. When visited by a smartphone or tablet 
user, the malicious website forces the user to download the plugin software, which is in fact a 
malware. If a web page causes the automatic downloading and installation of software without 
the Android device user’s consent, the page is considered malicious. This mechanism, which 
is also called drive-by-download, allows malware to control Android devices.
Automatic Scan
Automatic scan is performed to infect new victim’s devices by compromising and influencing 
them to be a part of the botnet. In this technique, a new host inside the botnet must be recruited 
to establish a new botnet through vulnerability scanning (Ianelli & Hackworth, 2005). This goal 
can be achieved by infecting many hosts, which attempt to identify exploitable vulnerabilities 
in other new hosts. For example, FTP services suffer buffer overflow exploitation (Lashkari, 
Ghalebandi, & Moradhaseli, 2011).
Near-Field Communication
Near-Field Communication (NFC) is an advanced wireless technology that allows fast data 
transfer between two close devices with an enabled NFC setting. NFC is related to mobile 
payments, such that it has the personal banking information of a user. It has gained popularity 
among botmasters for spreading malicious commands to compromise other devices because of 
its fast data transfer capability. In addition, dependence on NFC has induced the C&C channel 
of botnets to be more challenging (Stevanovic, Revsbech, Pedersen, Sharp, & Jensen, 2012). 
Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi has assured compensation over other communication media applicable to Android 
botnets. The use of open Wi-Fi networks for an Android botnet provides a higher level of stealth 
and fewer entry barriers than other communication media. Denial of service (DoS) attacks 
and distributed DoS attacks are threats that can simultaneously inflict devastation on many 
users. Apart from the aforementioned-infection vectors, smartphones could be compromised 
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using other methods e.g. the use of USB. If the files used to synchronise smartphones are 
compromised, malware can also infect smartphones. As a result, attackers can access the host’s 
classified information and instal malicious applications on the smartphone.
Android Botnet Architecture
Personal-computer-based botnet are considered the most compromised platforms for botnet 
attacks compared to the recently evolved Android botnets due to some limitations, such as 
limited battery power, limited processing speed, limited internet access and limited memory 
storage. Android botnets have similar architecture as computer botnets, namely, centralised 
architecture, decentralised architecture and hybrid architecture. Table 3 shows the advantages 
and disadvantages of existing Android botnet architecture with respect to map complexity, 
detection, message latency and survivability.
Table 3 
Command-and-Control architecture  
Architecture Centralised Decentralised Hybrid
Alias Star Peer-to-peer Random
Map Complexity Very low Medium-High Moderate
Detection Medium Low-Medium High
Message Latency Very low Moderate Moderate-High
Survivability Low-Medium Medium High
Centralised botnet architecture. In centralised botnet architecture, all the bots relate to a 
central command-and-control server to establish a communication channel with central point 
as illustrated in Figure 5. In centralised architecture, the botmaster controls and supervises 
all bots in a botnet from a single C&C server. Botmasters are able to communicate with the 
bots continuously by sending instructions to them through these central servers (Anwar et al., 
2014). As all bots receive commands and report to a C&C server, it is easy for botmasters to 
manage botnets using centralised architecture. Furthermore, centralised botnet architecture uses 
two types of topologies, star topology and hierarchical topology, and two types of protocols, 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) (Khattak, Ramay, Khan, 
Syed, & Khayam, 2014; Li, Jiang, & Zou, 2009). The design of centralised architecture is less 
complex compared to other architecture, while message latency and survivability rate are low. 
This causes low reaction time, easy means of communication and direct feedback (Plohmann 
et al., 2011).
It also possesses some limitations. For instance, centralised architecture has more maximum 
failure chances compared with other architecture. If the C&C server fails, then all the botnets 
may stop working because of the central point of control. Detection of a botmaster is easier 
compared than if the decentralised and hybrid architecture were used (Bailey, Cooke, Jahanian, 
Xu, & Karir, 2009; Cooke, Jahanian, & McPherson, 2005; Zang et al., 2011).
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Decentralised botnet architecture. In decentralised botnet architecture, no single responsible 
entity controls different bots in a botnet. More than one C&C server communicate with 
various bots as described in Figure 3. Botnets using decentralised architecture are known as 
decentralised botnets. However, the term peer-to-peer botnet is also commonly used for this 
type of botnet. Decentralised botnets are more difficult to detect compared with centralised 
botnets. Figure 6 shows that no specific C&C server exists in decentralised architecture, and 
all bots act as the C&C server and the client at the same time (Dong, Wu, He, Huang, & Wu, 
2008). Decentralised architecture is based on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols. Compared with 
centralised architecture, the design of P2P architecture is more complex and detection of a 
botnet with the same architecture is more difficult than detection of other botnets. Message 
latency and survivability rate are higher than those of the centralised botnet architecture. Failure 
chances are lower in decentralised architecture than in centralised architecture because if a C&C 
server fails, then other C&C servers can manage and monitor the botnet (Cooke et al., 2005).
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Centralised android botnet architecture. 
 
Decentralised botnet architecture.  In decentralised botnet architecture, no single 
responsible entity controls different bots in a botnet. More than one C&C server 
communicate with variou  bots as described in Figure 3. B tnets using decentralised 
architecture are known as decentralised botnets. However, the term peer-to-peer botnet is 
also commonly used for this type of botnet. Decentralised botnets are more difficult to 
detect compar d with c ntralised botnets. Figure 6 shows that no specific C&C server 
exists in decentralised architecture, and all bots act as the C&C server and the client at the 
same time (Dong, Wu, He, Huang, & Wu, 2008). Decentralised architecture is based on 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols. Compared with centralised architecture, the design of P2P 
architecture is more complex and detection of a botnet with the same architecture is more 
difficult than detection of other botnets. Message latency and survivability rate are higher 
than those of the centralised botnet architecture. Failure chances are lower in decentralised 
architecture than in centralised architecture because if a C&C server fails, then other C&C 
servers can manage and monitor the botnet (Cooke et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Botmaster
Bot
Command & Control Server
Botmaster
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Figure 5. Centralised android botnet architecture
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Centralised android botnet architecture. 
 
Decentralised botnet architecture.  In decentralised botnet architecture, no single 
responsible entity controls different bots in a botnet. More than one C&C server 
communicate with various bots as described in Figure 3. Botnets using decentralised 
architecture are known as decentralised botnets. However, the term peer-to-peer botnet is 
also commonly used for this type of botnet. Decentralised botnets are more difficult to 
detect compared with centralised botnets. Figure 6 shows that no specific C&C server 
exists in decentralised architecture, and all bots act as the C&C server and the client at the 
same time (Dong, Wu, He, Huang, & Wu, 2008). Decentralised architecture is based on 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols. Compared with centralised architecture, the design of P2P 
architecture is mo e complex and detection of a botnet with the sam  architecture is more 
difficult than detection of other botnets. Message latency and survivability rate are higher 
than those of the centralised botnet architecture. Failure chances are lower in decentralised 
architecture than in centralised architecture because if a C&C server fails, then other C&C 
servers can manage and monitor the botnet (Cooke et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Botmaster
Bot
Command & Control Server
Botmaster
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Bot
Figure 6. Decentralised architecture
Hybrid botnet architecture. Hybrid architecture is the combination of centralised and 
decentralised architecture as shown in Figure 7. Hybrid architecture comprises two types of 
bots, namely, the servant and the client. Bots are connected to the hybrid botnet as a client or 
a servant. Monitoring and detection of botnets with hybrid architecture is more difficult than 
detecting those with centralised and decentralised architecture. However, hybrid architecture 
is less complex in design.
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Mobile Botnet Detection Techniques
The challenges faced in mobile-device security are quite similar to those faced in personal-
computer security. To solve this problem, researchers have proposed and developed common 
desktop security solutions for smartphones. Some of the popular security solutions are listed 
below.
Kirin. Kirin security service is an OS-level protection service that provides enhanced 
security mechanisms for Android smartphone applications (Enck et al., 2009). This approach 
performs lightweight certification of applications to mitigate malware at installation time with 
modification of the Android applications installer. Kirin has different security rules; a well-
known combination of permissions is the most important part in these rules. To define these 
security rules, a detailed understanding of malware and protection techniques is required; it is 
usually performed by security experts. Furthermore, it prevents access to sensitive information. 
However, once information enters the application, no additional mediation occurs.
Multi-Agent system. Szymczyk (2009) proposed the Multi-Agent Bot Detection System 
(MABDS) based on the hybrid approach. It is the combination of multiple agents such as 
administrative agent, user agent, a central knowledge database, system analysis, honeypots, 
agent collections and network analysis (Silva et al., 2013). In this technique, each agent observes 
traffic using different sensors by implementing the Markov chain model to perform dynamic risk 
assessment (Shameli, Cheriet, & Hamou-Lhadj, 2014). These systems in multifaceted, piercing, 
real-time domains involve autonomous agents that should act as a team to compete against 
malware (Castiglione, De Prisco, De Santis, Fiore, & Palmieri, 2014). The slow convergence 
of new signatures with the knowledge database is the key limitation of this technique. The new 
signature updates are another limitation of this system (Karim et al., 2014).
SAINT. SAINT (Ongtang, McLaughlin, Enck, & McDaniel, 2009) is a rule-based runtime 
approach for Android application security that defines application protection at runtime, 
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depending on the caller and permission constraints. It protects Android applications from 
one another by their policies during the installation time and runtime interaction. In this case, 
it allows an application to define which application can access its interfaces and how other 
applications use those interfaces. This technique has the same limitation as Kirin security 
services. To define these security rules, a detailed understanding of malware and protection 
techniques is required, and security experts are required to perform the job.
AASandbox. AASandbox was the first technique to perform both static and dynamic analysis of 
the Android applications and was proposed by Bläsing, Batyuk, Schmidt, Camtepe and Albayrak 
(2010). The static analysis scans the Android applications for malicious patterns without 
installation on the Android platform, while in the dynamic analysis, the Android application 
is executed in a fully isolated platform called sandbox. It also intervenes and logs low-level 
interaction with the system for further analysis during application execution. In contrast, both 
the detection algorithm and sandbox algorithm are implemented in the cloud. AASandbox 
uses a system called foot-printing approach for detecting suspicious Android applications. In 
its early days, when AASandbox was proposed, there were no known botnet malware samples 
available to evaluate this technique, although it seems to be unmaintained nowadays.
Paranoid. Considering various factors of smartphone technology including resources, storage, 
processing and memory, Paranoid Android malware detection technique was proposed for the 
first time in mobile technology (Portokalidis, Homburg, Anagnostakis, & Bos, 2010). Paranoid 
Android is a security model implemented on remote servers (cloud server) to observe the 
dynamic behaviour of Android applications and to detect zero-day attacks, system call anomaly 
and antivirus file scanning. Both Crowdroid and Paranoid Android incur a 15-30% overhead 
for smartphone devices. This particular technique records information that is necessary for 
application execution and transmits it to a cloud server over an encrypted channel. While a 
complete replica of the executing application is running parallel on the remote virtual machine, 
the server can detect the potential malware using this technique. Both the application and 
its replica are executing parallel to one another, which may cause a lot of space and time 
complexity. It also converts energy by using ‘loose synchronisation’, which may cause loss 
of battery power usage that specifically sends information when the mobile user is using the 
mobile device.
Crowdroid. Crowdroid is a dynamic approach based on the behaviour of Android applications 
and was proposed by Burguera, Zurutuza and Nadjm-Tehrani (2011). Crowdroid is a lightweight 
application available online on Google Play Store, which can be downloaded and installed on 
Android smartphone devices. It monitors and collects the API calls of apps that are running on 
mobile devices and sends them to a centralised server after preprocessing. With the application 
of cluster algorithms, Android applications can be evaluated with this approach. The given 
approach is also able to detect self-written malware.
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DroidRanger. DroidRanger is the combination of two systems based on permissions’ behaviour, 
foot-printing and heuristic-based filtering ( Odili, Kahar, Anwar, & Ali, 2017). It was  proposed 
by Zhou, Wang, Zhou and Jiang (2012). This technique applies both the static and dynamic 
approaches to detect malicious applications in existing Android markets. Permissions-based 
behaviour foot-printing is used for the detection of known malware, while heuristic-based 
filtering is used for unknown malware Android applications. Despite the advancements in the 
detection approaches applied by DroidRanger, the system has some limitations; it requires 
manual operation for analysing and collecting behaviour of Android applications (Babu Rajesh, 
Reddy, Himanshu, & Patil, 2015). Manual operation takes more time than other detection 
techniques (Odili & Kahar, 2015).
Bouncer. Bouncer was proposed in 2012 by Oberheide and Miller (2012). It provides static 
and dynamic scanning together with Android applications that are automatically performed 
on the server. Google Play Store uses this technique to scan an Android application before 
hitting the application market (Penning, Hoffman, Nikolai, & Wang, 2014). Bouncer has the 
potential to take newly-uploaded applications to the app market. If this application is able to 
send an SMS to the malicious sites or detect other criminal activities, it classifies that Android 
application as malware. If not, it classifies it as benign. However, in this advanced era, it seems 
that cyber attackers have found ways to bypass detection. This technique is better for those 
who download applications from Google Play Store, while those who download applications 
from third-party app stores are not protected by this technique.
RobotDroid. RobotDroid is an Android malware detection technique that is based on SVM 
machine learning classifier algorithm and was proposed by Zhao, Zhang, Ge and Yuan (2012). 
This technique focusses on the signature of the applications. It has the ability to detect unknown 
malware like Plankton, DroidDream and Gemini. This framework can be used only for these 
few types of malware; this is the main limitation of this framework.
DroidScope. DroidScope designed by Yan and Yin (2012) is a fine-grained dynamic binary 
instrumentation tool for Android. It rebuilds two levels of semantic information: OS and Java. 
It provides an instrumentation interface that can be used to write plug-ins. It implements 
API tracing, native instruction tracing, Dalvik instruction tracing and taint tracking plug-ins. 
DroidScope works entirely on the emulator level and requires no changes to the Android 
sources. It runs the analysis outside the smartphone software stack and can analyse kernel-
level attacks. This system has a big drawback: not able to detect real-time attacks. The second 
drawback is that it does not cover the subtleties of real devices (Enck et al., 2014). 
Table 4 shows the list of Android botnet detection techniques with respect to year, major 
contribution and limitations.
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Table 4 
List of Android Botnet detection techniques  
Ref Techniques Year Architecture Key Concept Major Contribution Limitation
Enck et al., 2009 Kirin 2009 Static Based on 
permissions
Used rules to 
detect malware in 
installation time
No access to 
sensitive information 
of application; 
Cannot detect new 
malware
Szymczy, 2009 Multi-Agent 
System
2009 Hybrid Based on 
permissions and 
rules
Used agent for 
traffic analysis
Slow interaction 
with the knowledge 
database
Ongtang et al., 2009 SAINT 2009 Static/
Dynamic
Based on rules Installation time 
detection of 
malware
No access to 
sensitive information 
of application; 
Cannot detect new 
malware
Bläsing et al., 2010 AASandbox 2010 Static/
Dynamic/
Hybrid
Base on 
signatures and 
behaviour of the 
logs
Before instal 
detection of 
malware
NA
Portokalidis et al., 
2010
Paranoid 
Android
2010 Dynamic/
Hybrid
Based on 
behaviour
Dynamic analysis, 
memory scanners, 
system call 
anomaly detection 
Consumption of 
more time, space 
and power
Burguera et al., 
2011
Crowdroid 2011 Dynamic Based on 
behaviour
Client APK, 
behavioural 
detection
More clients, 
dynamic analyser
Zhou et al., 2012 DroidRanger 2012 Static/
Dynamic
Permissions-
based behaviour
Detection of known 
and unknown 
malware, 0-day 
malware detection
Only a few of all 
possible execution 
paths are negotiated 
within one analysis 
run
Oberheide & Miller, 
2012
Bouncer 2012 Static/
Dynamic
Permissions-
based
Detection of 
unknown malware
Can be easily evaded 
by cybercriminals 
Zhao et al., 2012 Robotdroid 2012 Static Signature-based Detection of 
unknown malware 
such as Plankton, 
DroidDream, and 
Gemini
Detects only specific 
malware families 
such as Plankton, 
DroidDream and 
Gemini
Yan & Yin, 2012 DroidScope 2012 Dynamic Dynamic binary 
instrumentation
Cannot detect real-
time botnet attacks
Zhou et al., 2012 DroidMOSS 2012 Dynamic Permissions-
based, 
Fuzzy Hashing 
Technique,
Identifies only 
repackaged official 
Android market 
applications
Alparslan, 
Karahoca, & 
Karahoca, 2012
Data Mining 2012 Static Behaviour-based utilise auditing 
programmes to 
extract and extend 
features
Cannot detect real-
time botnet attacks
Faruki, Ganmoor, 
Laxmi, Gaur, & 
Bharmal, 2013
AndroSimilar 2013 Static/
Dynamic
Statistical 
features
Improbable 
signature 
generation, thwarts 
obfuscation and 
repackaging
Limited malware 
DB, more false 
positives; Cannot 
detect new malware
Spreitzenbarth, 
Freiling, Echtler, 
Schreck, & 
Hoffmann, 2013
Mobile-Sandbox 2013 Static Smali, emulator Both static and 
dynamic analysis, 
obfuscation 
resistance, native 
API call track, web 
accessibility
More detection time
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DroidMoss. Zhou et al. (2012) proposed DroidMoss in 2012, using the fuzzy hashing technique 
to effectively localise and detect repackaged and injected applications. This technique   detects 
Android applications in the existing mobile app market that are injected with malicious codes 
using the repackaging technique. The main feature of the applications used in this technique 
is the Dalvik opcodes. DroidMOSS calculates fuzzy hashes on each N sequential opcode, 
Rastogi, Chen, & 
Enck, 2013
AppsPlayground 2013 Static/
Dynamic
N/A he-based UI 
interaction based 
on contextual 
exploration
Cannot detect real-
time botnet attacks
Reina, Fattori, & 
Cavallaro, 2013
CopperDroid 2013 Dynamic Behaviour-based 
approach
Automatically 
performs 
dynamic analysis, 
reconstructs 
behaviour of 
Android
Identifies only 
repackaged official 
Android market 
applications
Gascon, Yamaguchi, 
Arp, & Rieck, 2013
Embedded call 
graph
2013 Dynamic Function call 
graphs
Obfuscation 
resistance
Undecidability of 
static call graph 
construction; Cannot 
detect new malware
Abdelrahman, 
Gelenbe, Görbil, & 
Oklander, 2013
NEMESYS 2013 Static Model-based 
approach
Generate 
background traffic 
of network for 
simulating smaller 
set of users, learn 
Random Neural 
Network,
Limited to a small 
number of users, 
space complexity
Roshandel, 
Arabshahi, & 
Poovendran, 2013
LIDAR 2013 Static/
Dynamic
Behaviour-based automatically 
detects, analyses, 
protects, remediates
N/A
Moonsamy, Rong, 
& Liu, 2014
Mini Permission 
Pattern
2013 Static/
Dynamic
Based on 
permission
‘Used’ permission 
extraction, 
informative data 
from contrast 
permission patterns
Careful analysis 
of permissions, 
no repackaging 
resistance; Cannot 
detect new malware
Enck et al., 2014 TaintDroid 2014 Static Behaviour-based Different APIs, 
specifically SMS 
APIs
It does not track 
implicit control 
flows due to 
performance 
overhead
Suarez-Tangil, 
Tapiador, Pens-
Lopez, & Blasco, 
2014
Dendroid 
Approach
2014 Dynamic Code Chunks Unknown malware 
classification, 
fast and scalable, 
dendograms
No obfuscation 
resistance, large 
feature vectors; 
Cannot detect new 
malware
Dhaya & Poongodi, 
2014
N-gram analysis 2014 Static N-gram CVSS Produced N-grams 
signatures
No obfuscation 
resistance; Cannot 
detect new malware
Lindorfer, 
Neugschwandtner, 
Weichselbaum, 
Fratantonio, Van 
Der Veen, & 
Platzer,, 2014
Andrubis 2014 Static/
Dynamic
Based on 
behaviour and 
rules
Static and dynamic 
analysis on both 
Dalvik VM and 
System Level
Dynamic analysis 
consumes more 
space; Cannot 
be used for latest 
Android applications
Andronio, Zanero, 
& Maggi, 2015
Heldroid 2015 Static/
Dynamic
Behaviour-based Static and dynamic 
analysis
Portability, 
internationalisation 
and evasion
Table 4 (continue)
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which then applies a measure function on the two applications to realise their similarity 
quantitatively. The use of DroidMOSS is limited to identifying repackaged official Android 
market applications.
Data mining. The hardest part of the detection of malicious traffic is to differentiate C&C data 
flow from normal data flow behaviour. To overcome  this limitation, data mining techniques 
are  used  to recognise the pattern by extracting the unexpected network patterns (Alparslan 
et al., 2012). Data mining is the most used machine learning device method for classification, 
prediction, regression and inference. This technique is extensively used in anomaly detection, 
especially in establishing generic and heuristic methods (Odili, Kahar, & Noraziah, 2016; 
Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo, 2001). Data mining approaches detect structures in a wide 
range of data, such as byte code, and use these structures to detect upcoming malicious 
occurrences in related data. Researchers such as Gu, Perdisci, Zhang and Lee (2008), Gu, 
Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong and Lee (2007), Gu, Zhang and Lee (2008), Wang, Huang, Lin 
and Lin (2011) and Yu, Dong, Yu, Qin, Yue and Zhao (2010) proposed BotMiner, BotHunter, 
BotSniffer and behaviour-based botnet detection systems based on the data-mining approach. 
This technique is very effective though it has some limitation as well. In experiments, BotMiner 
and BotHunter have been able to achieve 99% success rate with 1% false alarm and 99.2% 
success rate with 0.8% false alarm, respectively (Zhao et al., 2013).
AndroSimilar. AndroSimilar  (Faruki et al., 2013) detects Android malware regions of 
statistical similarity starting from the .dex file. This method employs the similarity digest 
hashing system on byte-stream-based robust statistical malicious features. Similarly, a digest 
hashing scheme uses this feature to generate a list of signatures for this app. Here, the feature 
values between 100 and 990 are selected and the rest are discarded using the Bloom filter. 
A set of malicious signatures are generated and thus, a database of signatures is created. For 
testing a sample app, its signature is created in the same way as described above and is matched 
against a signature database and is considered malware if the similarity score crosses 35% 
(Sharma et al., 2016). Authors obtain an accuracy of 72.27% using a dataset of 101 malicious 
applications. Androsimilar performs at file level as an alternative for codes in decompiling; 
therefore, control of shared library is not protected. Also, porting the approach to constrained 
memory and a strong database remains a concern.
Mobile-SandBox. Mobile-SandBox is a static and dynamic analysis system that is publicly 
available. It was proposed by Spreitzenbarth, Schreck, Echtler, Arp and Hoffmann (2015). 
In this technique, the comparison of applications occurs in different stages: first, it compares 
the hash value with the VirustTotal database of the running application; second, it extracts 
the manifest file for permissions, background services, broadcast receivers and intents. This 
technique also extracts API calls from the Dalvik bytecode; thiss happen frequently in botnets. 
Mobile-SandBox makes it very easy to submit applications for static and dynamic analysis 
because of its user interface. A user can easily upload an application for static and dynamic 
analysis to the Mobile-SandBox by using the user interface. However, in some aspects, Mobile-
SandBox seems unable to cope with the submission load.
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AppsPlayground. AppsPlayground, based on TaintDroid, is a scalable dynamic analysis system 
that is used for detection of possible data leaks (Skovoroda & Gamayunov, 2015). Proposed 
by Rastogi, Chen and Enck (2013), it employs a Javaapp that connects to an emulator running 
a modified version of the OS and governs app behaviour exploration logic. Simply, the aim 
of AppsPlayground is to improve the stimulation of apps during dynamic analysis because it 
also detects dangerous API calls. 
This technique also helps to create a more realistic analysis environment. It tries to drive 
the app along paths that are likely to reveal interesting behaviour through targeted stimulation 
of UI elements. This approach can be seen as an intelligent enhancement of the Application 
Exerciser Monkey and the custom stimulation of activity screens. This technique is largely 
orthogonal, as it focusses on stimulating broadcast receivers, services and common events 
instead of UI elements. Its main contribution is a heuristic-based intelligent black box (Monkey 
Exerciser-like) execution approach to explore the app’s GUI (Odili, Kahar, Anwar, & Azrag, 
2015). This technique can be more useful if combined with the static analysis technique.
CopperDroid. CopperDroid is a dynamic detection system presented by Reina, Fattori 
and Cavallaro (2013) that is built on top of the quick emulator (QEMU). To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first technique that performs system call monitors of the Android 
applications out-of-the-box through virtual machine introspection (VMI) by reconstructing 
Dalvik behaviour and monitoring Binder communication (Lindorfer et al., 2014). CopperDroid 
carried the binder analysis to perform the reconstruction of high level Android-specific 
behaviour. It is available to the public as a web application that users can use to submit samples. 
Embedded call graphs. Embedded call graphs is a static approach proposed by Gascon 
Yamaguchi, Arp and Reick (2013) in 2013. This technique can be used to find similarities 
between samples: first,-it-extracts function call graphs and then employs explicit mapping 
through kernel graphs from map call graphs to-feature-space. Sharma, Chawla and Gajrani 
(2016) showed that time and space complexity are high and large, respectively. Its key concept 
is functions call graphs, while obfuscation resistance is the major contribution. Embedded call 
graphs specially observe assembly-level analysis and support vector-machine implementation. 
The main disadvantage of this technique is that it cannot decide the static call graph construction. 
NEMESYS. NEMESYS is a network model-based security solution that combines learning and 
modelling for detection of anomalies and attacks in mobile network. It deals with every mobile 
connection during communication between devices in a network. The motivation behind this 
approach was the difference between the number of mobile users who are monitored and dealt 
with in real time. Furthermore, a clear and understandable approach was needed to deal with 
every unique call. The second consideration in constructing this approach was the computational 
tools that were developed for anomaly detection that were based on mathematical models. 
However, NEMESYS has some limitations. For instance, it is limited to a small number of 
users. Also, this approach is complex and it uses a huge amount of memory.
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Layered intrusion detection and remediation. The Layered Intrusion Detection and 
Remediation (LIDAR) framework focusses on automatic detection, analysis, protection and 
remediation of security threats. This framework is specially designed to detect intrusion in 
a multi-dimensional mode that is of network dimension, application dimension and social 
dimension (Roshandel, Arabshahi, & Poovendran, 2013). This approach contains both local 
and remote analyses, which causes some drawbacks. For instance, a set of local analyses is 
performed in the mobile device to detect malware and intrusion, leading to the use of more 
battery power in addition to time consumption and space complexity, among other issues.
TaintDroid. TaintDroid is a system-wide dynamic taint tracking and analysis system for 
simultaneous tracking of multiple sources of sensitive data. This technique monitors methods, 
variables, files and messages during application execution according to data flow (Suarez-Tangil 
et al., 2014). TaintDroid uses tag chunks to keep track of data in order to find information 
leakage at runtime. Information flow tracking needs lots of memory. None of these schemes 
is energy-efficient; hence, they are not suitable for resource-constrained mobile platforms.
Dendroid approach. The dendroid approach is based on text mining and information retrieval 
techniques (Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014). This technique extracts code chunks (CC) to analyse 
and classify the code structures in Android malware families. The authors present a simple 
way to measure the similarity between malicious applications by formulating the modelling 
process. In the experiments performed, more than 33 families with 1249 malware applications 
(Sharma et al., 2016) were detected. This approach also provided automatic classification of 
zero-day malware samples, which is based on the applications-code structure. With respect 
to time and accuracy, this technique is very fast and accurate, with high scalability. However, 
this technique features vector growth and new families create issues, while the strategies of 
obfuscation are not implemented. 
N-gram. The N-gram [12] analysis is a probabilistic approach to detect the presence of malware. 
Reverse engineering tools like DexToJar, Java Decompiler-Graphical User Interface (JD-GUI) 
and ApkTool are used in this technique to convert executable to source code (high level or low-
level language), thereby creating the training dataset. After this, the source code is considered 
as N-gram signatures. This N-gram model is a popular machine-learning algorithm and it is a 
type of probabilistic language that predicts the next item in the sequence with given datasets of 
order (N−1) as in the Markov Model. These signatures are then stored in a Comma Separated 
Values (CSV) file for the reason that signatures occupy a lot of space. 
After this, a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is used to assess the 
vulnerabilities’ severity level in software applications. It is a freeware tool. By applying this 
tool on the APK file under test, the description of all the vulnerabilities and solutions to mitigate 
the same is appended to the CSV file. It makes intuitive use of the N-gram machine-learning 
algorithm to analyse the Android apps. Limitations include the obfuscation techniques not 
being implemented. 
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Andrubis. Andrubis is a cloud-based malware detection technique proposed by Lindorfer et 
al. (2014). This technique combines both static and dynamic analyses on both Dalvik VM and 
the system level. First, it performs the static analysis by extracting the information including 
broadcast receivers, requested permissions, activities, services, SDK version and package name 
from the application manifest and its bytecode. Andrubis uses the modified DroidBox output 
to generate XML files that contain the analysed results. In the dynamic stage, it executes the 
application in a complete Android environment; during the execution its action is monitored 
at both the Dalvik and the system level. Other than this, Andrubis provides a web interface for 
users to submit Android applications and, so far, it has collected a dataset of over one million 
Android applications, 40% of which are malware. The only disadvantage of this technique is 
that it cannot track native codes. API calls that frequently happen in botnet are extracted from 
the Dalvik code, while the Andrubis is limited to the application’s API level 8.
HELDROID. HELDROID is a fully automated behaviour-based approach to recognise known 
and unknown ransomware and scareware (Andronio et al., 2015). This approach analyses 
the Android application statically and dynamically as well. By using the static taint analysis 
approach, it analyses the function calls flow. Its result is more accurate when compared to 
those of previous apps. Still, it has some limitations. Although they focus on the mobile case, 
the results shown are far from being accurate. Ransomware is a general problem, but in this 
approach, it is limited to mobile devices only. HELDROID is based on sentence structure; this 
needs internationalisation.
CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, we discuss the challenges and future directions based on the findings of our 
study. Research into Android botnets is still in its initial stages. Therefore, sufficient opportunity 
exists for the betterment of detection and prevention of botnet attacks. The following challenges 
will help the researchers, academics and industry players to enhance this field. 
Hybrid Approach Towards Android Botnet Detection
There is no way to ignore the rising security threats to mobile devices at this time. Researchers 
and industry players have proposed different botnet detection techniques. Practically, most of 
the existing Android botnet detections are either static or dynamic, and can detect known and 
unknown Android botnets. As can be seen in Table 2, few of the existing detection techniques 
based on the hybrid approach have a low detection rate and maximum false-alarm rate. This 
is a disturbing discovery.
Limitation of Mobile Devices
Personal computers are considered a more suitable platform for botnet attacks compared 
with mobile devices. Mobile devices have certain limitations, such as limited power storage, 
limited memory storage, limited Internet access and resource constraints. They attract 
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cybercriminals because of the open environment they operate in as well as their availability, 
Internet connectivity and storage capacity. 
Existing Android botnet detection techniques are based on the estatic and dynamic 
approaches. These require heavy battery consumption, which is the most crucial challenge in 
protecting mobile devices (Ali, Zain, Zolkipli, & Badshah, 2014). Furthermore, the dynamic 
approach of scanning and blocking malicious codes needs a runtime environment. This is a 
big issue for mobile devices due to their limited battery power.
Internet Service Providers Should Also Provide Security Measurements
One of the biggest challenges for Internet Service Providers (ISP) is to protect mobile device 
users from the botnet threats as they do not use static addresses. Mobile device users are 
continuously changing their location; this creates difficulties for ISPs.
Difficulties in Estimating Botnet Size
It is very difficult to estimate the botnet size. To the best of our knowledge, there is no technique 
that estimates the size of compromised bots in a botnet. With rapid developments in detecting 
botnet attacks in Android devices, researchers need to find a quantitative methodology to find 
the number of bots in a botnet (Odili & Kahar, 2016). 
CONCLUSION
Android botnets are harmful to Android devices. The popularity of mobile devices has made 
it a soft target for potential attacks. This survey aimed to find the real threat behind Android 
botnets. We conducted a comprehensive survey of existing Android botnets and their detection 
techniques. We categorised the detection techniques according to their detection environment, 
such as static, dynamic and hybrid detection techniques. Limitations in the existing Android 
botnet detection techniques as well as their benefits are listed here in an organised way. To the 
best of our knowledge this is the most current organised survey on Android botnets and their 
detection techniques. This research will help both academics and industry players.
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